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RECENT DECISIONS
that the statute defining the power to punish summarily must be
strictly interpreted and its application narrowly limited. See
Nye v. United States, 313 U. S. 32 (1940).
Janet C. MoFarlan4
LABOR LAW-DEFENSIVE LOCKOUT AS
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
When negotiations between a multi-employer association and
union had reached an impasse, over an association-wide contract,
the union struck against one member. The other eleven members
immediately notified their employees that their stores were closed
because of the union's action. The National Labor Relations
Board ruled that the employers had committed an unfair labor
practice. Davis Furniture Co., 94 N. L. R. B. 279 (1951). On ap-
peal, the Court of Appeals held that the evidence upon which the
Board relied did not support its finding that such action was a
mere reprisal to defeat the strike, and remanded the case to the
Board for a determination of whether such a temporary lockout
was lawful when used in a labor dispute solely as a counter-
economic force to resist the strike. Davis Furniture Co. v.
N. L. R. B. - F. 2d 1 30 L. R. R. M. 2294 (9th Cir. May 29,
1952). The Board again found that this temporary lockout vio-
lated §8 (a) (1) and (3) of the LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIoNs ACT,
June 23, 1947, 29 U. S. C. §158 (a) (1) and (3). Davis Furniture
Co., 100 N. L. R. B. No. 158 (Sept. 5, 1952).
At common law the lockout was considered a lawful device to
resist the threat of the labor movement. Iron Moulders Union v.
Allis Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 46 (7th Cir. 1908); Sinsheimer v.
United Garment Workers, 77 Hun 215, 28 N. Y. Supp. 321 (Sup.
Ct. 1894); see also M-Willis and Montgomery, ORGANIZED LABOR 555,(1945). The NATIONAL LABOR RElATIONs ACT, 49 STAT. 449 (1935),
29 U. S. C. §§151-166 (1947) which proscribes as unfair labor prac-
tices any interference with protected union activity does not ex-
pressly forbid or sanction lockouts. The Board has declared a
lockout to be in violation of the Act where the plant was closed by
the employer in circumstances that indicated that the real reason
for the closing was to avoid and destroy the rights of the em-
ployees as provided by the Act. N. L. R. B. v. Hopwood Retinning
Co., 98 F. 2d 97 (2d Cir. 1939); N. L; R. B. v. Stremel, 141 F. 2d
317 (10th Cir. 1944). See also, Teller, LABOR DISPUmEs Am CoLTZc-
TivE BARGAINING (1940 ed.), I, 247, 494, and II, 771-772.
Lockouts have been permitted where the employer would
otherwise be subjected to undue economic hardship, e. g.: (1) until
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a union signed a no-strike pledge to prevent continued business
losses that resulted from repeated strikes, International Shoe Co.,
93 N. L. R. B. No. 159 (March 26, 1951); (2) where there was a
threatened sit down strike which would cause syrup spoilage,
Duluth Bottling Ass'n., 48 N. L. R. B. 1335 (1943) ; (3) to prevent
loss of customer good will which would have resulted from a clos-
ing of repair shops while cars were dismantled. Betts Cadillac
Olds., Inc., 96 N. L. R. B. No. 46 (September 21, 1951).
In Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. N. L. R. B., 190 F. 2d 576,
582 (7th Cir. 1951), with facts identical to those of instant case the
Court, in remanding to the Board said, "(E)mployers should be
able to counter the economic force of a strike with the economic
force of a lockout". Before the Board, however, the action of the
employer was found to be a complete discharge and illegal on such
grounds. Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 30 L. R. IR. M. 1178 (June
30, 1952). The question posed by the Court as to whether a lockout
quoted above would be legal if used defensively was not met by the
Board, and stands as but an indication of the judicial attitude on
it.
In the instant case the Court said,
(B)y the linking of the terms "strike" and "lockout" in the
statute, it is arguable that Congress has recognized strikes
and lockouts as correlative powers to be employed by the ad-
versaries in collective bargaining when an impasse in negotia-
tions is reached. _ F. 2d , 30 L. R. R. M. 2294, 2299 (9th
Cir. May 29, 1952).
Together, these remarks indicate that the Courts may now
sustain a lockout in the absence of circumstances creating an un-
due hardship to the employer, when they find that the employer
was not trying to break the union or interfere with the protected
concerted activity but was only resisting, with an economic force.
the economic pressure of the strike. They reach this result on the
ground that the bona fide motive or purpose of the lockout keeps
it from violating the proscriptions of the Act.
However, the Board in the instant case, found that this tem-
porary lockout constituted interference with protected union
activity, despite the good motives of the employer. In its deter-
mination, the Board was primarily concerned not with the mo-
tives involved, but rather with the results of the employer's acts.
Therefore, the lack of intent to interfere was held not to excuse
conduct which in fact did interfere. N. L. R. B. v. Hopwood Re-
tinning Co., supra; N. L. R. B. v. Somerset Shoe Co., supra.
In so holding, the Board continues to appraise a lockout from the
point of view of its results. In the Morand case, supra, the Court
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in formulating a test based on intent was attempting to equalize
what they considered to be the inferior bargaining position of an
employer. Such an approach was contrary to the test traditionally
employed by the Board.
The decision of the instant case, in repudiating the test formu-
lated by the Court in the Morand case illustrates the Board's ap-
parent determination to retain policy formulation on 'the adminis-
trative level.
Marion James Tizzano
ARBITRATION-AWARD OF CONDITIONAL PENALTY BY
ARBITRATION BOARD HELD UNENFORCEABLE
An arbitration award against a union for striking in violation
of its collective bargaining agreement was affirmed by the supreme
court under N. Y. CIVI PBACTiCE ACT §1461. The award provided
for $2000 actual damages and a conditional penalty of $5000, pay-
able if the arbitration board finds that the union has again violated
its non-strike provision. The contract gave the arbitrators ex-
press authority to make this agreement effective, including the
power "to impose damages, money or other penalties" upon any
party found guilty of a violation. HELD (3-2): Penalty vacated
on the grounds that (1) the penalty provision of the agreement
is unenforceable at law and (2) the award is not final and definite
within Cvii PRACTICE ACT §1462 (4). Matter of Publishers' Assn.
(Newspaper Union), 280 App. Div. 500, 114 N. Y. S. 2d 401 (1st
Dep't 1952).
The New York courts have consistently adhered to the gen-
eral rule that the award of, an arbitrator cannot be set aside for
errors of judgment either as to the law or the facts if the a:bitra-
tor keeps within his jurisdiction and is not guilty of fraud, cor-
ruption or other misconduct. Matter of Wilkins, 169 N. Y. 494, 62
N. E. 575 (1902); Matter of Delma Engineering Corp., 293 N. Y.
653, 56 N. E. 2d 253 (1944). An award becomes enforceable except
where grounds exist as specifically provided in CvnL PRACTICE ACT
§k1462 for vacating the award. Errors, mistakes, and departures
from strict legal rules are included in the arbitration risk. Pine
Street Realty Co. v. Coutrouios, 233 App. Div. 404, 253 N. Y. S.
2d 309 (1st Dep't 1931). In general the courts are reluctant to re-
consider the merits of arbitration awards. Morris White Fash-
ions, Inc. v. Susquehanna Mills, Inc., 295 N. Y. 450, 68 N. E. 2d 437
(1946). Courts would defeat the chief advantages of arbitration
by reviewing the merits of an award. See Scoles, Review of
Labor Arbitration Awards on Jurisdictional Grounds, 17 U. o'
